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Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus 
to Emerge 
Shai Dothan 
Abstract 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) searches for human rights policies that 
are adopted by the majority of the countries in Europe. Using a doctrine known as “emerging 
consensus,” the court then imposes these policies as an international legal obligation on all the 
countries under its jurisdiction. But the ECHR sometimes defers to countries, even if their policies 
fall short of the standard accepted by most of the countries in Europe. This deference is 
accomplished by using the so-called “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Naturally, emerging 
consensus and margin of appreciation are often conceived as competing doctrines: the more there 
is of one, the less there is of another. This article suggests a novel rationale for the emerging 
consensus doctrine: the doctrine can allow the ECHR to make good policies by drawing on the 
independent decision-making of many similar countries. In light of that, the article demonstrates 
that a correct application of the margin of appreciation doctrine actually helps emerging consensus 
reach optimal results by giving countries an incentive to make their policies independently.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is a regional human rights 
court located in Strasbourg, France. It monitors compliance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Convention).1 The Convention guarantees 
individuals basic human rights such as the right to life, the right to liberty, and the 
right to a fair trial, among many others. Furthermore, the Convention allows 
individuals to file applications directly to the court against the countries that 
violated their rights.2 
The court’s jurisdiction covers forty-seven European countries with a total 
of 800 million citizens.3 Since its establishment in 1959, the court has issued 
approximately 20,000 judgments,4 making it the most prolific international court 
in history.5 Moreover, the court has examined more than 700,000 applications,6 
most of them by individuals claiming their rights were abused.7 The impact of the 
court on the life of Europeans is difficult to exaggerate. The court also served as 
a model for creating the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, extending its influence far beyond Europe.8 
Scholars have noted that the ECHR is starting to behave as a constitutional 
court that not only helps specific applicants, but also tries to improve the 
protection of human rights across Europe.9 They have studied the ECHR as a 
                                                 
1  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
2  See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, art. 34, Nov. 11, 1994, E.T.S. 
No. 155.  
3  See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE: 50 YEARS OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2010), https://perma.cc/2GFN-7W35. 
4 See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ECHR OVERVIEW 1959-2016 3 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/5PS7-L3MV.  
5 See OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST SATISFACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS i (2015). 
6  See ECHR OVERVIEW 1959-2016, supra note 4, at 4.  
7 A person, non-governmental organization, or group of individuals who were victims of a violation 
by a member country may file an application according to article 34 of the Convention. While, 
under article 33 of the Convention, the court can also receive applications from countries who are 
members of the Convention regarding violations by other member countries, such applications 
account for only a fraction of the ones filed. See Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of Judicial Activism over 
Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361, 372 
(2009). 
8  See THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE, supra note 3, at 16.  
9  See Joshua L. Jackson, Note, Broniowski v. Poland: A Recipe for Increased Legitimacy of the European Court 
of Human Rights as a Supranational Constitutional Court, 39 CONN. L. REV. 759, 777–81 (2006). 
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prototype for effective international courts10 and described the judicial tactics used 
by the court to attain its enormous power.11 
But despite all the praise from academics, the ECHR is under constant fire 
from the press and from European politicians.12 Many people think the court is 
overreaching and intruding on the sovereignty of countries. They have criticized 
the court for making it difficult to extradite criminals and suspected terrorists out 
of Europe,13 and for trying to force European countries to allow prisoners to 
vote.14 
Some countries are trying to push the ECHR to defer more to domestic 
authorities and curb its judicial activism. The ECHR has traditionally used a 
doctrine called the “margin of appreciation” to justify deference to country 
policies. This doctrine is not mentioned in the Convention, and some countries 
were concerned that the court doesn’t use it often enough. To address this 
problem, representatives from all member countries agreed in April 2012 on the 
Brighton Declaration, which calls on the court to apply the margin of appreciation 
consistently and, moreover, calls for including the margin of appreciation doctrine 
                                                 
10  See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (explaining how lessons from the success of the European 
Court of Justice and the ECHR could be used to enhance other international courts).  
11  See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 115 (2011); 
SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 212–61 (2015). 
12  See Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 411, 
418 (2013) (showing how, following severe criticism of the ECHR in the U.K. press, there was a 
sharp decline in the support for the court by the British public). 
13  See Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 159. In this case, the ECHR 
prevented the deportation of an extremist Muslim cleric to Jordan because he was supposed to 
stand trial for terrorism there and the court feared that the trial would rely on evidence extracted 
from others using torture. The cleric was eventually extradited after a lengthy legal struggle. See also 
A. A. v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. In this case, the court prevented the deportation of 
a Nigerian who was convicted of rape at the age of 15. The social ties the applicant developed in 
Britain were the reason for preventing the deportation. The British Media fulminated against this 
judgment. See James Slack, Social Ties Keep Rapists in Britain, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 21, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/EV58-5HAW. 
14  See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187. In this case, the ECHR decided 
that a blanket ban on prisoner voting violates the Convention. See Greens & M.T. v. United 
Kingdom, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57. In this case, the ECHR required the U.K. to change its laws 
on the disenfranchisement of prisoners within six months. British politicians were incredibly critical 
of these judgments and the former British Prime Minister David Cameron was even quoted as 
saying that giving the right to vote to prisoners makes him “physically ill.” See Andrew Hough, 
Prisoner Vote: What MPs said in Heated Debate, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/C8FT-
A7MX. 
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in the preamble of the Convention.15 Following the Brighton Declaration, a new 
Protocol, Protocol 15, was drafted to amend the Convention. This Protocol 
specifically mentions that states enjoy a margin of appreciation. Also, in 
accordance with the Brighton Declaration, it refers to the principle of subsidiarity, 
according to which states have the primary responsibility to protect the rights 
enshrined in the Convention.16 The principle of subsidiarity provides the standard 
justification for the margin of appreciation granted to European countries, in 
recognition of their special ability to make fitting and legitimate policies for their 
own citizens using their own democratic procedures.17 So far, Protocol 15 has 
been ratified by thirty-six European Countries, and signed by nine others.18 
Although the protocol will not enter into force until ratified by all forty-seven 
Convention members, scholars have argued that the ECHR has already started to 
restrain itself in response to this powerful backlash.19 
Will deference lead to a decline in the vast judicial impact of the ECHR? Not 
necessarily. This article highlights a counter-intuitive benefit of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine. Surprisingly, margin of appreciation may aid in the correct 
use of what many see as its greatest rival: the doctrine of “emerging consensus.” 
The emerging consensus doctrine is used by the ECHR to discover the 
minimal human rights standards that are respected by at least a majority of the 
countries in Europe. This minimal standard is then required from all European 
countries. States that do not grant these minimal standards will be found in 
violation of the Convention by the ECHR. 
Emerging consensus can be justified in light of a simple mathematical model 
called the Condorcet Jury Theorem. This model stipulates that a majority vote in 
a group of similar decision-makers, who decide independently, is more likely to 
be correct than the choice of each individual decision-maker. The problem with 
using the Jury Theorem to justify emerging consensus is that not all countries in 
Europe are similar in every respect, and some countries may be motivated not to 
decide independently. 
                                                 
15  See European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration: High Level Conference on the Future 
of the European Court of Human Rights 3–4, ¶ 12 (Apr. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/QW3G-
2W9Y.  
16  Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 1, June 24, 2013, ETS No. 213. 
17  Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
907, 912, 918–22 (2005). 
18  See the list of ratifications and signatories updated up to July 12, 2017, Chart of Signatures and 
Ratifications of Treaty 213, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Oct. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/E3FQ-KXNJ.  
19  See Mikael Rask Madsen, Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a 
New Deal on Human Rights in Europe?, J. INT’L. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (forthcoming 2018), 
https://perma.cc/4UCA-TD4Y. 
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This is where the margin of appreciation doctrine can assist the correct 
application of emerging consensus. Clearly, if a country is fundamentally different 
from the rest of Europe, it should be granted a margin of appreciation and the 
ECHR should not obligate it to conform to the policies of dissimilar countries. 
The ability of the margin of appreciation to assist in satisfying the condition of 
independent decision-making is slightly less obvious. Margin of appreciation 
allows the ECHR to provide speedy guidance to European countries without 
actually finding a violation and risking political backlash. This decreases the 
incentive of countries to imitate the policies of their neighbors. Furthermore, 
margin of appreciation allows the ECHR to provide a proper warning about the 
content of emerging consensus before finding any country in violation. This 
decreases the incentive of countries to try to guess where the European consensus 
is going by themselves and to follow it in order to preempt future violation 
findings against them. 
There are also cases in which emerging consensus cannot help the ECHR to 
discover good policies. First, when countries are still deliberating about what the 
law should be, the ECHR cannot learn much from their current legal positions. 
Second, when countries can choose from several legal options based on a balance 
of several conflicting considerations, the Jury Theorem logic breaks down. These 
cases give rise to the so-called Condorcet Paradox—a situation in which the 
choices of group members cannot be aggregated to form a true majority decision. 
In these situations, the ECHR should avoid emerging consensus. It may decide to 
do that by deferring to the state using margin of appreciation. But it may also 
decide to intervene and find a violation based on other doctrines at its disposal. 
Section II describes the doctrines of emerging consensus and margin of 
appreciation as they are applied by the ECHR. Section III points out that the 
application of emerging consensus could be justified as leading to the 
informational benefits of the Jury Theorem and discusses potential criticisms of 
this argument. Section IV highlights that the ECHR’s use of margin of 
appreciation to defer to countries that differ from the rest of Europe can maintain 
good policies upheld by these countries. Section V highlights situations in which 
although the ECHR’s use of the margin of appreciation could sustain country 
policies that are inferior to the European consensus, the use of margin of 
appreciation is essential to allow for the correct identification of the European 
consensus by the ECHR and to incentivize countries to decide independently. 
Section VI addresses situations in which emerging consensus cannot be 
adequately discovered. Section VII concludes. 
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II.  THE DOCTRINES OF EMERGING CONSENSUS AND MARGIN 
OF APPRECIATION  
The emerging consensus doctrine directs the ECHR to take current views 
on human rights policies into account as it interprets the Convention. It therefore 
serves as a tool to adapt the meaning of the Convention over time to changing 
conditions.20 There are three common understandings of the doctrine. The first 
suggests that the doctrine directs the court to consider the laws of European 
countries. The second suggests that the doctrine directs the court to consider the 
views of experts. And the third suggests that the doctrine directs the court to 
consider the views of the European public.21 Recent empirical evidence reveals 
that the ECHR in fact follows a version of the first understanding; if the majority 
of European countries protect a certain human right, the ECHR interprets the 
Convention as protecting this right and finds countries that infringe this right in 
violation of the Convention.22 
An interview with a former judge of the ECHR confirms that the research 
division of the court often prepares a comparative analysis of the laws in all, or at 
least most of, the countries in Europe to assist ECHR judges in Grand Chamber 
cases—legally important cases that are referred to a panel of seventeen judges.23 
The comparative report will sometimes include a short description of the law in 
every European country, but it will sometimes be limited to answering a simple 
identical question about the provisions of the law in every country. If a substantial 
majority of the countries in Europe adopted a legal solution or if a little more than 
half of the countries adopted a solution that seems to be supported by a growing 
trend across Europe, this is an argument judges can use in favor of adopting that 
legal solution as the correct interpretation of the Convention. Sometimes the 
comparative analysis prepared for the judges is only a minor supportive tool, but 
sometimes it affects the result and then judges will usually mention the emerging 
consensus argument in their judgment. Judges do not always follow the emerging 
consensus in Europe, but they are sometimes criticized for digressing from it by 
                                                 
20  See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 31 (1978) (indicating that the ECHR 
should interpret the convention in light of present day conditions, including the developments in 
the laws of European countries).  
21  See Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 133, 139 (1993).  
22 See Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from 
LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 106 (2014); see also KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, 
EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12, 
37 (2015) (explaining that the ECHR will usually identify an emerging consensus even if countries 
in Europe are not unanimous but show a convergence towards protecting a certain right, which is 
protected by a significant majority of countries).  
23  Interview with David Thór Björgvinsson, former judge of the ECHR (Sept. 13, 2016). 
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dissenting judges. Judges may be persuaded not to follow emerging consensus 
because of arguments based on the margin of appreciation or on respect for 
profound moral values of the countries.24 
The margin of appreciation doctrine directs the ECHR to grant European 
countries some leeway to make their own policies without finding them in 
violation of the Convention. The width of the margin of appreciation determines 
the amount of leeway granted to the countries. The narrower the margin of 
appreciation, the more likely the ECHR will find a country in violation of the 
Convention; and the wider the margin of appreciation, the more likely the ECHR 
will defer to the country and not find it in violation. The ECHR judgments list a 
series of factors that determine the width of the margin of appreciation. These 
include the type of rights infringed by the country, the interests at stake, and the 
aims pursued by the country when it infringed the rights.25 A key factor that 
determines the width of the margin of appreciation is the existence of a European 
consensus on the issue. 
The ECHR decided that if there is no European consensus regarding the 
protection of a certain human right, the margin of appreciation granted to the 
countries would be wider than if such a European consensus existed.26 The margin 
of appreciation and emerging consensus are therefore competing doctrines. The 
more the court is able to identify a European consensus on an issue, the narrower 
the margin of appreciation it grants to the countries. The less the court is able to 
identify a European consensus, the wider the margin of appreciation it grants to 
the countries.27 
III.  WHY EMERGING CONSENSUS CAN LEAD TO GOOD 
POLICIES  
A.  Applying the Jury Theorem 
A common intuition is that if many decision-makers consider a problem and 
prefer a certain policy over others, this policy is probably a good one and hence a 
policy worth following by other actors. The eighteenth century French 
philosopher Nicolas de Condorcet developed a model that supports this intuition, 
                                                 
24  Id. 
25  See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 127–28, ¶¶ 77–78; Dean Spielmann, 
Allowing the Right Margin the European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, in 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 318, 
390–403 (Kenneth Armstrong et al. eds., 2012).  
26  See Evans v. United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 382, ¶ 77 . 
27  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 10, at 316–17; Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus 
and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 851 (1999).  
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known as the Jury Theorem. According to the Jury Theorem, if a group of 
decision-makers have to choose between two options, and each individual 
decision-maker has an equal probability of more than fifty percent of reaching the 
correct result, then the majority’s decision in this group is more likely to be correct 
than that of any individual decision-maker. The theorem holds that the larger the 
group of decision-makers, the higher the probability that the majority’s decision 
will be correct.28 
For the Jury Theorem to work, the decision-makers within the group must 
satisfy two conditions: they must be similar to each other—otherwise the option 
chosen by one may not necessarily suit others; and they must decide independently 
and refrain from following each other’s decisions—otherwise, additional decision-
makers do not minimize the risk of error. 
Some scholars argue that the Jury Theorem implies that countries should use 
comparative law to learn from the experiences of other countries.29 Because 
countries make informed and sophisticated assessments on what policies they 
should adopt, they resemble decision-makers who are more likely to decide 
correctly than to err. Therefore, countries comply with the basic condition for the 
applicability of the Jury Theorem. This means that the majority of countries in the 
world or in a specific region are likely to adopt better policies than each country 
can adopt on its own. Accordingly, the emerging consensus doctrine, which 
directs the ECHR to follow the policies used by the majority of European 
countries, leads the ECHR to adopt good human rights policies. 
Yet emerging consensus will only lead to good policies when the countries 
comply with the conditions for the applicability of the Jury Theorem. In other 
words, emerging consensus is worth following only as long as the countries 
considered are similar and make their policies independently. This article argues 
that the ECHR can use the margin of appreciation to limit the application of 
emerging consensus to situations in which countries are similar to each other. It 
further argues that a proper use of the margin of appreciation would incentivize 
countries to decide independently. 
                                                 
28  To illustrate the power of the Jury Theorem, consider this simple numerical example. Imagine a 
group of decision-makers deciding by majority vote in which each decision-maker has a 60% 
probability to be right. If the group has five members, the probability that the decision of the group 
will be correct is 68.3%. For eleven members, the probability is 75.3%. For twenty-one members, 
it is 82.6%. For fifty-one members, it is 92.6%. If every decision-maker has a 70% probability to be 
right, the results are even more extreme. Five members would have an 83.7% probability to be 
right, eleven members would have a 92.2% probability. Twenty-one members would have a 97.4% 
probability. With fifty-one members, the right result is practically guaranteed—the probability of 
making the right choice is 99.9%. 
29  See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006). 
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B.  Potential  Criticism 
It is worth mentioning at this point that the statement that the majority of 
countries are likely to decide correctly is not free from criticism. After all, a 
European consensus that restricts human rights instead of protecting them may 
also develop.30 One can argue, for example, that countries are ruled by political 
majorities that serve the interests of some parts of society at the expense of the 
rights of minorities. As a result, national policies across Europe—not just in the 
country whose case is before the court—are going to discriminate against 
minorities.31 
Nevertheless, scholars who analyzed the actual application of emerging 
consensus by the ECHR suggest that this doctrine is in fact often used to protect 
minorities. The court sometimes used emerging consensus to justify intervention 
and enforcement of higher standards of minority protection. When the European 
consensus violates the rights of minorities, the court will often use its discretion 
and decide not to follow emerging consensus. Besides, the standards of human 
rights protection in Europe specifically are already quite high, which justifies the 
use of emerging consensus to learn from the practices of most European 
countries.32 
Theoretically speaking, even if every country has minorities and 
discriminates against them in certain ways, there is no reason to think that all 
countries will discriminate against the same minorities in the same way and push 
the European consensus in the same direction. If most countries do not 
discriminate in the same manner, they would not form a harmful European 
consensus. For example, if a third of the countries violate the right of minorities 
to a fair trial, another third harms their freedom of speech, and another third 
violates their privacy, the emerging consensus doctrine would obligate all 
countries to protect all three rights. After all, the Jury Theorem is based on the 
idea that individual decision-makers may be biased, but because they are not 
biased in the same direction, their biases will balance themselves out and the 
majority’s opinion will be optimal.33 
In case of a prevalent and persistent bias against minorities, deferring to the 
country is not a better option than following the European consensus. On the 
                                                 
30  See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 146–47 (2005); Paolo G. Carozza, Uses 
and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1998). 
31  See Benvenisti, supra note 27, at 851. 
32  See DZEHTSIAROU, supra note 22, at 122–29.  
33  See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore, 
3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 125, 130–31 (2002). 
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contrary, scholars have argued that the ECHR should intervene more in cases that 
concern minorities’ rights because national policies are naturally suspect in this 
area.34 There is even some evidence that the ECHR actually gives a narrower 
margin of appreciation to countries in cases that concern minorities.35 Even if the 
European majority cannot be trusted on such issues, any individual country would 
be even less trustworthy. 
If the court cannot rely on emerging consensus in cases that involve a 
persistent bias against a certain minority, it may theoretically rely on abstract moral 
principles to justify intervention. Sometimes, this is the only reasonable option. 
The problem is that moral principles are contested, and therefore their application 
may be arbitrary and may damage the legitimacy of the court’s decision.36 All this 
leaves relying on emerging consensus an imperfect tool, but probably the least of 
all evils. 
One may think about yet another theoretical challenge to the use of emerging 
consensus for promoting human rights protection across Europe. The emerging 
consensus doctrine is used by the ECHR to set a minimum, a “floor,” of human 
rights standards that are required from all countries. Countries are allowed, of 
course, to grant more protection than this floor; they are only required not to grant 
less protection. The problem is that human rights are often relational: protecting 
one right inevitably implies restricting another, forming a “ceiling” for its 
protection.37 If the court protects the freedom of speech of journalists, for 
example, it will limit the privacy rights of celebrities. 
This challenge doesn’t pose any problem to the application of the emerging 
consensus doctrine, even if it requires a degree of rhetorical skill from the judges. 
The Jury Theorem is useful exactly because it can help solve real dilemmas in 
which every choice has both advantages and disadvantages. When a right is 
violated—even if this violation itself implies the protection of other rights—the 
ECHR can look to the practice of all countries in Europe and examine whether 
they allow this violation. If most countries do not allow the violation, either 
because they do not view the attendant protection of other rights as sufficiently 
                                                 
34  See Benvenisti, supra note 27; Shai Dothan, In Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the European Court 
of Human Rights, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 508, 520–23 (2014). 
35  See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 27–31 (2012); Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of 
Judicial Review beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review 10 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 1023, 1042 (2012); Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent 
Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 647, 664–65 (2014). 
36  See DZEHTSIAROU, supra note 22, at 117–18.  
37  See FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 38–39 (2014).  
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important or for any other reason, the emerging consensus doctrine would 
counsel the court to find the practice of the country in question in violation of the 
Convention. This judicial tool reflects the decisional advantage of the Jury 
Theorem. 
IV.  FULFILLING THE SIMILARITY CONDITION  
Countries usually shape their human rights regimes to suit the interests of 
their citizens.38 When countries are similar to one another, the legal regime chosen 
by each country is likely to prove beneficial for the citizens of other countries as 
well. All countries differ from each other across many dimensions, but some of 
the differences between the countries are irrelevant to certain legal choices. In 
contrast, a country’s unique attributes should affect other legal choices. If the 
difference between the countries is relevant to the nature of the preferred legal 
regime, the experience of other countries is a less useful tool to discover the 
proper law. 
The differences between European countries are probably less significant 
than the differences between countries all over the world. All countries in the 
Council of Europe are democracies39 and share the same region. Many of the 
countries also share a common heritage and similar political ideals. This suggests 
that the use of emerging consensus within Europe can lead to better results than 
the use of comparative law to learn from countries around the world. 
That said, some European countries differ from others in legally relevant 
respects. If a country is different from the rest of Europe, the laws adopted by 
other countries may not be beneficial for the citizens of that country. In these 
cases, the ECHR should grant a wider margin of appreciation to the country and 
defer to its policies in many respects. 
In Şahin v. Turkey,40 for example, a practicing Muslim female student who 
viewed it as her religious duty to wear a headscarf brought an application against 
Turkey. She argued that regulations in a Turkish university that forbade her from 
wearing a headscarf infringed her freedom of religion protected by the 
Convention. Because no other European country has forbade the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf at a university, the overwhelming European consensus, in her 
view, should limit Turkey’s margin of appreciation and condemn its regulations as 
                                                 
38  See Shany, supra note 17, at 920 (arguing that human rights regimes chosen by each country do not 
create significant externalities on the other countries, thus implying that countries do not have to 
counter foreign influence and instead can shape their legal regimes to suit their citizens’ interests).  
39  The fact that European countries are democracies also implies that many of their laws are 
determined in majoritarian institutions that are likely, according to the Jury Theorem logic, to lead 
to good policies, and hence to policies that should be followed by other countries.  
40  Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173. 
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a violation of the Convention.41 The ECHR considered the fact that Turkey was 
significantly different from the other European countries—it is a country 
inhabited predominantly by Muslims, while its unique history and its fear of 
extremist groups strongly commit it to secularism.42 In light of that, the court 
granted Turkey a margin of appreciation and decided that its practices did not 
violate the Convention. 
In some issue areas, all European countries are different from each other, 
and therefore the European consensus is less instructive. For example, while 
Turkey may indeed be unique in terms of its religious dilemmas, the court in the 
Şahin case also stressed the fact that attitudes towards religious symbols are diverse 
across Europe generally. Such diversity supports greater deference to the 
countries’ policies.43 
When the ECHR applies a wider margin of appreciation to a country because 
it is different, it can therefore sustain a regime that is more suitable to the citizens 
of that country than the regime adopted by the majority of European countries.44 
Under these conditions, granting the country a wide margin of appreciation would 
therefore keep good policies in place. 
V.  ENSURING A GENUINE CONSENSUS  
The optimal human rights policies are adopted if all European countries 
make their policies independently and the ECHR applies the policies used by the 
majority to all the countries that are not fundamentally different from the rest of 
Europe. But sometimes the ECHR strategically digresses from the correct 
application of emerging consensus. This behavior may suit the court’s interest, but 
it jeopardizes the collective European interest in adopting the best policies. 
Countries may also serve their own interests and fail to decide independently. In 
these cases, the ECHR cannot discover the best policies by following emerging 
consensus. This suggests that a proper use of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
can give both the ECHR and the countries incentives to act in ways that would 
allow emerging consensus to discover the best human rights policies. 
                                                 
41  See id. at 201, ¶ 100.  
42  See id. at 205–08, ¶ 114. For criticism of this decisions, see id. at 221–22, ¶ 3 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).  
43  See id. at 204, ¶ 109.  
44  Even if a country is not different from the other countries, it may have vastly superior skills at 
making good policies and should therefore stick to its own policies instead of learning from other 
countries. The Jury Theorem implies, however, that errors are minimized extremely effectively as 
the size of the deciding group increases. As can be seen from the numerical example in note 28, 
supra, even a small number of decision-makers can do much better than a single highly sophisticated 
actor. The possibility that one country would have better decision-making abilities than a group of 
forty-seven countries, provided these countries all face similar conditions, is very unlikely.  
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A.  The ECHR Manipulates Its Decisions to Avoid Backlash  
When the ECHR issues judgments interpreting the Convention, it applies 
doctrines such as emerging consensus that are well grounded in its case law. These 
doctrines shape the court’s decision, but they are not its sole determinant. The 
ECHR, like other international courts, also shapes its judgments in light of the 
possibility that certain decisions may provoke countries to harm the court’s 
interest.45 For example, countries may fail to comply with judgments they view as 
excessively demanding.46 Countries may also criticize the court in ways that can 
prove disastrous to its public support across Europe. In extreme circumstances, 
countries may even try to damage the court’s budget, to change the Convention, 
or to leave the court’s jurisdiction.47 If the ECHR does not consider this possibility 
of backlash, it may risk losing its ability to function as an effective institution and 
ultimately its ability to set policies that are followed across Europe. 
The ECHR may therefore change its decision and digress from the accurate 
application of emerging consensus in order not to provoke countries to harm its 
interests. To the extent that emerging consensus leads the ECHR to the best 
possible result, the ECHR’s strategic behavior may lead it to issue judgments that 
adopt inferior policies. If countries conform to the policies required by the 
ECHR’s judgments, they may adopt bad laws. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine allows the ECHR not to find a country 
in violation of the Convention without at the same time characterizing it as 
conforming to the European consensus. A judgment that relies on the margin of 
appreciation to prevent a finding of violation does not present the country’s 
actions as conforming to the European consensus. As a result, other countries 
that seek to follow emerging consensus as a tool for making good policies would 
not try to imitate the policy adopted by that country. European countries would 
realize that the country’s conduct was saved from a finding of violation not 
because it conformed to the European consensus, but because the country was 
granted a margin of appreciation. 
If the ECHR grants the country a margin of appreciation, no violation is 
found and no acts of compliance are required. Consequently, the country cannot 
express its protest by noncompliance. Because the ECHR ultimately approves the 
country’s practices, the country is also much less likely to criticize the court or to 
harm it in any other way than if the court found it in violation. The margin of 
                                                 
45  See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response 
to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 942–44 (2005) (arguing that only a subset of the 
decisions that are legally possible are also politically possible for international judges); Tom 
Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 632 (2005) 
(arguing that international courts are constrained by the preferences of countries).  
46  See Dothan, supra note 11, at 122. 
47  See Ginsburg, supra note 45 at 656–68; DOTHAN, supra note 11, at 61–113.  
Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus to Emerge Dothan  
Winter 2018 407 
appreciation therefore allows the ECHR to establish an emerging consensus 
accurately and present it in its judgment, while minimizing the fear of backlash by 
not finding the country in violation. An accurate presentation of the emerging 
consensus is crucial as a tool to guide other countries to adopt good policies. 
But the margin of appreciation is more than just a tool to facilitate the honest 
application of emerging consensus. More generally, it allows the ECHR to avoid 
making false doctrinal rulings by giving it a way out of finding countries in 
violation, while at the same time not presenting their conduct as conforming to a 
correct reading of the Convention. For example, in the case of Ireland v. United 
Kingdom,48 the ECHR reviewed the special emergency measures that the U.K. took 
against terrorists in Ireland during the 1970s. When scrutinizing the measure of 
extra-judicial detentions, the ECHR stressed that the national government is 
better placed to decide what measures are required to combat the threat to the 
peace and should therefore be allowed a margin of appreciation. Ultimately, the 
court concluded that due to the emergency conditions prevailing at the time, the 
derogations from the protection of the right of liberty by the detentions were 
permitted and did not constitute a violation of the Convention.49 The ECHR may 
not have been able to condemn the detentions undertaken by the U.K. as violating 
the Convention for fear of backlash. The court did find some investigative 
techniques of the U.K. to be violations of the Convention, and may have feared 
that an even more intrusive intervention in its security considerations would lead 
to a hostile response against the court. The margin of appreciation allowed the 
court to minimize its risk of incurring the ire of the U.K., without at the same time 
granting a stamp of approval to all of its security policies. 
B.  The ECHR Delays I ts Decisions to Avoid Backlash  
As the last Subsection pointed out, the ECHR may consider the political 
implications of its judgments and change its decisions to avoid a hostile response 
by the country. Another option available for the ECHR to prevent backlash is to 
delay its judgments on sensitive issues until the views of the countries and their 
citizens become more hospitable to the judgment viewed by the ECHR as correct. 
The ECHR can refuse to hear cases under its jurisdiction only under clearly 
defined conditions. These conditions usually ensure that no significant violation 
occurred.50 But the ECHR can strategically avoid deciding certain cases by 
                                                 
48  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). 
49  Id. at ¶¶ 207, 214.  
50  The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by 
Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 art. 35(3), Nov. 14, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. reads: 
The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under 
Article 34 if it considers that: 
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declaring that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. In this manner, the court can postpone 
its decision on delicate issues for many years, until it believes that it can issue a 
judgment on the issue without excessively jeopardizing its interests. 
For example, in Bankovic v. Belgium,51 citizens of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia lodged a complaint against seventeen European countries that were 
members of NATO.52 The applicants claimed that these countries violated the 
Convention by their involvement in a NATO air strike that killed civilians. The 
ECHR decided that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the case, because the 
attack occurred outside of the territories of all countries subject to the 
Convention. This decision was criticized as digressing from the ECHR’s previous 
judgments,53 yet it allowed the ECHR to avoid finding violations in the actions of 
the most powerful and influential countries in Europe and, thereby, to prevent a 
serious backlash.54 
Only ten years later, in the Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom55 and Al-Jedda v. United 
Kingdom56 cases, which reviewed the U.K.’s military actions in Iraq, the ECHR 
amended its doctrine regarding jurisdiction and decided that when countries 
exercise extraterritorial control—even in territories that were never subject to the 
Convention—the ECHR can still take the case. The ECHR may have calculated 
that European countries would be much more tolerant to scrutiny of military 
actions in Iraq in 2011 than to scrutiny of military actions in Yugoslavia in 2001. 
Therefore, it was only in 2011 that the ECHR thought political conditions allowed 
                                                 
a. the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual 
application; or 
b. the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires 
an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may 
be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal. 
51  Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
52  Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the U.K.  
53  See Alexandra Rüth & Mirja Trilsch, Bankovic v. Belgium (Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT’L L 168, 172 
(2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 529, 545 (2003). Previous ECHR 
decisions on extraterritorial jurisdiction include: Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 
23–24, ¶ 62 (1995); Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2234, 2234–35, ¶ 52; Cyprus v. 
Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 25. 
54  See Dothan, supra note 11, at 139.  
55  Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99.  
56  Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305. 
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it to scrutinize the extraterritorial military actions of countries.57 But the outcome 
of this strategy, in addition to adding harmful ambiguity to the ECHR’s doctrines 
on jurisdiction, was that a clarification of the laws applicable to the exercise of 
military power outside a country’s territory was delayed for an entire decade. 
The postponement of cases due to political considerations adds on to other 
factors in delaying the endorsement of emerging consensus by the ECHR. Other 
reasons for delay include the rapidly increasing number of cases and the court’s 
limited resources that lead to a huge backlog of undecided cases,58 as well as the 
fact that countries can take years to form established policies on new legal 
problems.59 
If the ECHR takes too long to find an emerging consensus, countries are 
deprived of the privilege of rapidly identifying the European consensus by 
following the ECHR’s judgments. In this case, countries may have a strong 
incentive to learn from other countries in an effort to immediately improve their 
policies. According to the Jury Theorem’s logic, a country can improve its policies 
by following the majority of countries in Europe. But countries that learn from 
each other do not make decisions independently. Because all countries do not 
make their policy decisions at the same time, the countries that establish policies 
first are likely to influence the policy decisions of other countries, preventing those 
countries from exercising fully independent judgment. Later on, countries may 
not be able to distinguish between the countries that made their policy 
independently and those that simply imitated other countries. Countries may 
therefore follow policies that do not reflect a real majority decision of all the 
countries. Instead, they may end up following later imitations of the countries that 
just happened to make their policy first on the issue—a phenomenon known as 
an “information cascade.” 
When more and more countries imitate each other instead of making an 
independent decision, the policy adopted by the majority does not enjoy the 
informational benefit of the Jury Theorem.60 Consequently, when countries fail to 
                                                 
57  See Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 455, 475–
76 (2013). 
58  In 2015, 40,650 applications were allocated to the judges, and 45,576 applications were disposed of 
judicially, reducing the backlog of cases to 64,850. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2015 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/8LA7-GEHM. 
59  This problem is addressed in Section VI.A, infra.  
60  The use of comparative law by countries is therefore self-defeating—the more prevalent the use of 
comparative law, the lower its informational benefits become for the countries that use it. This is a 
problem with the argument of Posner and Sunstein in favor of the use of comparative law by 
national courts, which they acknowledge in their paper. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 
163. Elsewhere I argue that international, regional, and federal courts can use comparative law while 
minimizing this problem. Therefore, when the ECHR uses the emerging consensus doctrine, it can 
reach superior results compared to national courts that use comparative law. See Shai Dothan, The 
Optimal Use of Comparative Law, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 21, 23–24 (2014).  
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decide independently, the ECHR would not be able to use emerging consensus to 
make good policy choices. 
In order to give countries an incentive not to follow other countries, the 
ECHR must therefore try not to delay its policymaking. If countries know that 
they can learn the optimal policy from the ECHR’s decision within a short time, 
they will be more willing to make an independent decision. This way countries 
know that the inferior policy they adopt on their own can soon be replaced by the 
policies required by the ECHR. If countries are deciding independently, the 
ECHR would be able to identify a genuine European consensus and lead to the 
best possible policy. 
Some countries may be reluctant to adhere to the inferior policies they can 
adopt on their own, even if they know they would be quickly replaced by the 
policy set by the ECHR. Yet if all countries realize that an independent decision 
is essential to allow the ECHR to identify a European consensus, countries that 
fail to decide independently would be branded as harming the collective interest. 
To avoid this stigma, countries may be willing to maintain the laws they can reach 
on their own for a short while, provided they know that the ECHR would discover 
the emerging consensus as rapidly as possible. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine allows the ECHR to identify the 
European consensus without at the same time finding a country in violation. If 
the ECHR knows that it can find the consensus without subjecting itself to 
backlash, it will have no incentive to delay its decision by avoiding sensitive cases, 
as it did in the Bankovic case. This will allow the ECHR to establish a European 
consensus quickly, thereby reducing countries’ incentive to learn from each other. 
Consequently, the European consensus would be a genuine one and reflect the 
independent decisions of the countries.61 
C. Emerging Consensus May Induce Countries to Follow a 
Perceived Majority  
In addition to the incentive to make good policies, another factor affecting 
the countries’ decisions is the fear that they might be found in violation of the 
                                                 
61  If countries have scarce resources to invest in policy research and they know that the ECHR is 
likely to decide quickly, however, they may rationally decide to invest fewer resources in determining 
what policy to adopt, knowing that it would soon be replaced by the ECHR’s decision. In this 
manner, the quality of every individual policy made by the countries would decline, and so would 
the quality of the majority’s decision identified by emerging consensus. Fortunately, the Jury 
Theorem shows that, in a large group of decision-makers who make decisions that are only slightly 
better than random, the majority’s decision is still very likely to be correct (see the numerical 
example in note 28, supra). Therefore, if the forty-seven countries of the Council of Europe make 
independent decisions based on a cheap and easy assessment of the facts known to them, the 
policies adopted by the majority will probably be good.  
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Convention by the ECHR. If a country is found in violation, the finding damages 
its reputation for compliance with its international commitments. The finding 
signals that the country is not willing to sustain the costs necessary to maintain its 
reputation for compliance with international law. Countries that are unwilling to 
sustain such costs are perceived as bad actors—if they will not honor their treaty 
commitments, they might break their promises to other countries in pursuit of 
quick gains.62 
Countries may change their policies to avoid a finding of violation against 
them by the ECHR. To avoid a finding of violation, countries may try to conform 
in advance to the standards of human rights they expect the ECHR would require 
in the future. If countries know that the ECHR applies emerging consensus and 
follows the majority of countries in Europe, they may try to find out what the 
majority of countries are doing and adopt that policy before the ECHR finds them 
in violation. 
There is a danger in an attempt by all countries to conform to what they 
perceive to be the policy adopted by the majority. Every country may realize that 
all the other countries have the same incentive: to detect the majority and conform 
to it so as not to be found in violation by the ECHR. If some countries start to 
protect a certain human right, other countries may decide to follow suit, not 
because they believe that protecting this right is good policy, but because they do 
not want to be left out in a minority that does not protect this right. Since all 
countries realize that all the other countries have the same fear of sticking to 
minority policies and being found in violation, they would all grant protection to 
the right. In this manner, European countries that try to guess what the European 
majority prefers might end up adopting policies that would be rejected by the 
majority of the countries in Europe had they decided independently of each 
other.63 
The fear that may dissuade countries from deciding independently is the fear 
of falling behind the majority of countries and consequently being found in 
violation. The ECHR can mitigate this fear through the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. By using this doctrine, the ECHR can indicate the European consensus 
                                                 
62  See Dothan, supra note 11, at 119–22.; ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: 
A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33–36 (2008).  
63  This guessing game is known in Game Theory terms as a “Beauty Contest,” after a thought 
experiment used by Keynes in which a group of newspaper readers can choose the six prettiest 
photographs from a hundred photographs of models and win a prize if they choose the same 
photographs chosen by the majority. In such a situation, the readers choose not what they think are 
the prettiest pictures, but what they think the majority thinks that the majority thinks (etc.) are the 
prettiest photographs. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY 156 (1936). Similarly, countries that fear a finding of violation if they remain 
in the minority may try to guess what the majority of countries think that the majority prefers, 
leading to results that cut against the views of the real majority.  
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to the countries without at the same time finding them in violation. This ruling 
gives the countries a proper warning before they are found in violation. It allows 
countries to make their policies independently, knowing that they will not be 
found in violation unless the ECHR warns them first, and indicates the consensus 
that they should follow in the future. 
For example, the ECHR indicated dissatisfaction with the U.K’s laws 
regarding transsexuals for years before finding the U.K. in violation of the 
Convention. In Rees v. United Kingdom,64 issued in 1986, the ECHR decided that 
keeping a transsexual’s former sex on his birth certificate, which he has to display 
at certain occasions, and preventing him from marrying a person of his opposite 
current sex, do not violate the Convention. The court and the Commission (the 
first tier of review at the time) called attention to the fact that several European 
countries granted greater protection to transsexuals, although no clear consensus 
was then detected.65 The court eventually granted the U.K. a margin of 
appreciation that prevented a finding of violation, but at the same time it voiced 
a concern for the suffering of transsexuals and indicated that the issue should be 
kept under review in light of future scientific and social developments. 
The ECHR continued to warn the U.K. that its policies were out of step 
with proper protection of transsexuals in later cases. In Cossey v. United Kingdom,66 
the ECHR highlighted again the severity of the problem and the need to keep the 
issue under review. In Sheffield v. United Kingdom,67 the ECHR showed increasing 
displeasure with the U.K.’s practices. In this case, the court stressed that only four 
out of thirty-seven European countries studied prevented a reassignment of the 
sex in the birth certificate. Finally, after warning the U.K. for fifteen years that its 
practices digressed from the European consensus, the ECHR eventually found 
the U.K. in violation in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,68 issued in 2002. 
It appears that despite the great variability of the laws on transsexuals, the 
ECHR was able to discern an emerging consensus against the U.K.’s practices 
long before the Goodwin case. But up until then the ECHR had granted the U.K. 
a margin of appreciation, thereby warning it that in the future it may be found in 
violation without actually condemning it as breaking its treaty commitments.69 
                                                 
64  Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). 
65  See id. at ¶¶ 37, 44.  
66  Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1990). 
67  Sheffield v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011, 2029. 
68  Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
69  Some may argue that the ECHR was not convinced that a European consensus forbidding the 
U.K.’s practices existed much prior to the Goodwin case. On this account, the ECHR used the 
margin of appreciation as a way to delay the declaration of consensus until trends in Europe became 
clearer while at the same time signaling to the U.K. that its actions were under close scrutiny. See 
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This exercise allowed the ECHR to signal to European countries that they can 
make their laws independently without fearing a finding of violation prior to being 
warned. To the extent that this maneuver was successful, it may have incentivized 
countries to make their policies independently without guessing what policy the 
majority of the countries would opt for and thereby facilitated the finding of a 
genuine European consensus by the ECHR. 
VI.  WHEN EMERGING CONSENSUS CANNOT BE DISCOVERED 
The preceding Sections showed that by using the margin of appreciation the 
ECHR can either protect country policies that should be deferred to or create the 
preconditions under which a genuine European consensus can emerge. This 
Section addresses two slightly different situations. These are situations in which 
emerging consensus cannot be adequately inferred from the practices of countries. 
This does not mean that country policies should be deferred to, however. The 
ECHR may use the margin of appreciation simply because it sees no justification 
to intervene in country policies when there is no contrary European consensus. 
But the ECHR may also decide to intervene in country policies by using other 
legal doctrines. 
A.  The Law is Stil l  in Flux  
The Condorcet Jury Theorem recommends following the majority view in a 
group of decision-makers because it relies on the assumption that each decision-
maker is making a rational decision and is more likely to be right than to be wrong. 
When these conditions are fulfilled, the theorem mathematically guarantees that 
the majority’s decision is more likely to be correct than the decision of each 
individual decision-maker.70 
Countries that make their laws in parliament after a public debate, or whose 
national courts make policy based on reasoned decisions, resemble rational 
decision-makers. This justifies the use of emerging consensus to aggregate the 
views of countries and follow the majority’s view. But what if the relevant 
conditions in the countries are currently changing? What if countries are amending 
                                                 
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 10, at 317. This explanation may account for the Rees case. But in 
contrast, when the Sheffield case was issued, the emerging consensus was already established in 
Europe, at least regarding the reassignment of birth certificates. The court points to global trends 
outside of Europe in favor of granting transsexual rights, trends that may have strengthened until 
the Goodwin case was issued. Yet the influence of these trends was probably not the reason for the 
different result. This article argues that the ECHR did not delay its finding of violation to wait until 
it was certain that a consensus existed, but rather to allow the U.K. a clear prior warning before it 
issued a judgment against it.  
70  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 141.  
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their laws rapidly to address a new situation? Even if the law is in a state of flux, 
all countries technically have a policy on the issue: after all, if a behavior is not 
forbidden, then it is allowed. But this is policy by default. It does not stem from a 
rational decision that responds to current circumstances and therefore there is no 
reason to assume that it is correct. In these cases, there is no justification for using 
emerging consensus. 
S.A.S. v. France71 demonstrates the problems generated by new phenomena 
that are addressed legally by some countries but not by others. The case concerned 
the right of Muslim women in France to wear a full-face veil in public. When the 
case was decided, France and Belgium were the only European countries that 
legislated provisions forbidding concealment of the face in public.72 But, at the 
time, the possibility of a similar ban was being discussed in some European 
countries, and in others wearing full-face veils was so rare that it did not yet 
constitute a real issue. Because most European countries did not consciously 
address this problem and decide against a ban—rather, they simply did not make 
any decision and left the permission to wear veils as the natural default position—
the court decided that there was no European consensus on the issue.73 The court 
ultimately decided to defer to the French policy and not to find a violation of the 
Convention.74 
Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom criticized this position. They argued that 
the contemporary laws in Europe clearly indicated a consensus of countries that 
did not think it was necessary to legislate in this area.75 The complex comparative 
law details in this case could be debated. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to judge 
whether a country chose to maintain its laws on the issue or did not yet decide. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that when countries did not make a rational choice to opt 
for a certain legal regime or even to sustain the regime they have in place in light 
of changing conditions, their current laws do not possess any decisional 
advantages that can justify the use of the emerging consensus doctrine. 
B.  Choice Between Several  Options  
Condorcet indicated an exception to his Jury Theorem that is known as the 
Condorcet Paradox. The Condorcet Paradox shows that when a group of several 
decision-makers have to choose between more than two potential options, the 
choice of the group’s majority does not always follow the condition of transitivity. 
This means that the way in which the votes of the group are counted determines 
                                                 
71  S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341. 
72  See id. at ¶ 40. 
73  See id. at 380–81, ¶ 156.  
74  See id. at 381, ¶ 157–59.  
75  See id. at 387–88, ¶ 19 (Nußberger, J., & Jäderblom, J., dissenting). 
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what constitutes the policy preferred by the majority. Under these conditions, no 
meaningful majority can be identified. 
The Condorcet Paradox could prevent the use of emerging consensus when 
countries make their legal choice out of several possible options because of several 
conflicting considerations. As the Condorcet Paradox shows, if countries can 
consider conflicting considerations, the way they rate their preferences may lack 
transitivity. 
In judgments that could show an awareness of this problem, the ECHR has 
been reluctant to identify an emerging consensus when countries make similar 
policies for different reasons. The A, B, & C v. Ireland76 case is a potential example. 
The court decided that since countries in Europe had not reached a consensus on 
whether a fetus should be considered a person, the apparent consensus in their 
legislation regarding greater access to abortion cannot solely determine whether 
Ireland’s prohibition of abortion struck a fair balance between the rights of the 
fetus and the rights of the mother.77 
This characterization of the boundaries of the issue, where emerging 
consensus should be discovered, was criticized by some judges as requiring too 
much for the discovery of emerging consensus and by others as requiring too little. 
On the one hand, Judge Rozakis and five others wrote a dissenting opinion 
arguing that the decision when life begins is irrelevant since this was not the 
question before the court. The question was not whether the fetus was a person; 
it was whether the right of the fetus—person or not—weighs less than the right 
of the mother in most European countries. The majority of countries answer this 
question in the affirmative, forming a consensus.78 On the other hand, Judge 
Geoghegan wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the existence of abortion 
legislation does not form any consensus regarding the striking of a balance 
between all the relevant interests. Many reasons could lead to the adoption of 
legislation, and some countries may not have a public interest in the protection of 
the unborn as exists in Ireland. The consensus, argued Geoghegan, should be on 
striking the right balance, but if other countries have other public interests, they 
may be striking a different balance and therefore not forming any consensus.79 
While A, B, & C seems to suggest that the reasons behind country choice 
of legal policies matter, it does not demonstrate how the Condorcet Paradox 
actually unfolds. To understand how the Condorcet Paradox materializes, 
consider another issue that the ECHR dealt with: prisoners’ voting rights. This 
issue is addressed in Hirst v. United Kingdom.80 Under certain assumptions about the 
                                                 
76  A. v. Ireland, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185. 
77  Id. at 261, ¶ 237. 
78  Id. at 280–82, ¶ 2 (Rozakis, J., et al., dissenting). 
79  Id. at 279 (Geoghegan, J., concurring). 
80  Hirst, supra note 14, at 216, ¶ 82. 
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underlying views of countries on the rights of prisoners to vote, the Condorcet 
Paradox appears. These assumptions are just possible legal views on the right to 
vote. The paper makes no attempt to suggest that they actually reflect the views 
of specific European countries, but they can help highlight the theoretical 
possibility of the Condorcet Paradox. 
In Hirst, the ECHR was tasked with deciding whether a blanket ban on the 
right of prisoners to vote violates the Convention. The judgment related that 
eighteen countries in Europe allowed all their prisoners to vote, thirteen countries 
prevented all their prisoners from voting (including the U.K., whose policies were 
being examined), and twelve countries had taken away the right to vote from some 
prisoners under certain conditions.81 Countries that condition the prevention of 
prisoners from voting on certain facts usually consider the number of prison years 
in the verdict, the severity of the crime, and the connection between the crime 
and the democratic process. Alternatively, they leave the decision on taking the 
right to vote to the convicting judges.82 
The countries of Europe thus choose from at least three options: (A) allow 
all prisoners to vote; (B) take away the right to vote from some prisoners under 
certain conditions; (C) deny all prisoners the right to vote. An analysis of 
judgments from countries around the world on the issue of prisoners’ voting 
rights reveals that there are at least three distinct views on the nature of the right 
to vote: (1) voting is an inalienable right that cannot be taken away; (2) voting is a 
revocable right: although it belongs to the voter, it can be taken away under certain 
conditions; (3) voting is a privilege: it does not belong to citizens and they may 
only use this privilege under certain conditions. Even in the simplest case 
imaginable—three countries with different views on the nature of the right to vote 
choosing from a menu of three policy options—the Condorcet Paradox may 
theoretically appear.83 
Countries that view voting as an inalienable right prefer policy A over all 
others. When they have to choose their second-best option, their choice is 
impossible to predict with certainty. Perhaps they would prefer policy B over 
policy C to let as many prisoners as possible vote. 
Countries that view voting as a revocable right would certainly prefer policy 
B over all others. Their second-best policy is a mystery. Some countries view 
disenfranchisement as problematic and would try to reserve it only to rare and 
                                                 
81  Hirst, supra note 14, at 200–01, ¶ 33.  
82  See Shai Dothan, Comparative Views on the Right to Vote in International Law: The Case of  Prisoners’ 
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special circumstances. They may prefer letting everybody vote to denying the vote 
to all prisoners. In other countries, however, giving all prisoners the right to vote 
is completely unacceptable. This policy preserves the voting rights of prisoners 
that these countries think definitely should not vote, for example prisoners who 
committed severe crimes. For the sake of the argument, let us follow the latter 
type of countries and choose policy C as better than policy A (denying the right 
to vote to all prisoners over giving the right to vote to everyone). 
Countries that view voting as a privilege often subject prisoners to what is 
known as “civic death”: because prisoners violated the social contract, they all 
deserve to be disenfranchised.84 These countries will clearly favor policy C. Their 
second-best policy depends on what these countries view as more important: to 
treat all prisoners equally and signal a clear social stigma, or to disenfranchise as 
many prisoners as possible. In most countries, the disenfranchisement of 
prisoners does not have any effect on election results.85 The policy can therefore 
be viewed as a question of principle and not of strategy. Countries that view the 
principle of treating all prisoners the same as more important than the number of 
disenfranchised prisoners could prefer policy A over policy B. They would prefer 
to let everyone vote instead of giving the right to vote only to some prisoners. 
Table 1 presents the hypothetical preferences explained above: 
Table 1: Possible Preferences of Countries with Different Views on Voting 
Rights 
 First best Second best Third best 
(1) Voting as an 
inalienable right 
A B C 
(2) Voting as a revocable 
right 
B C A 
(3) Voting as a privilege  C A B 
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Under these assumptions, most countries (two out of three) prefer A over 
B. Most countries also prefer B over C. At the same time, however, most countries 
prefer C over A. If the preferences of the countries are indeed A>B>C>A, their 
preferences are intransitive. The majority’s choice depends on the order in which 
the countries are asked to rate one policy option over another. The Condorcet 
Paradox appears. 
In the example above, the Condorcet Paradox emerges because countries 
are taking into account several different considerations when they determine their 
preferences. Countries care both about the number of prisoners allowed to vote 
and about treating prisoners equally. Legal systems face such difficult cases all the 
time, but they usually use the legal process to break complex decisions into a series 
of simpler choices that avoid the problem of intransitivity.86 
The Hirst case does not provide an easy way to break up the choices of the 
countries and find a majority that is not subject to the Condorcet Paradox. If 
emerging consensus fails as a result of the Condorcet Paradox, it may be beneficial 
to limit its use by widening the margin of appreciation granted to the country. But, 
in contrast to the other cases mentioned in Sections IV and V, the use of the 
margin of appreciation neither increases the chance of a better decision in the case 
at hand nor improves the conditions for the applicability of the Jury Theorem. In 
fact, the court can use other doctrines to intervene in domestic policies, and then 
there is no necessary justification to grant countries an especially wide margin of 
appreciation. The court’s decision in Hirst to strike down the U.K.’s policies on 
prisoners’ voting rights based on other normative arguments besides emerging 
consensus—such as preventing indiscriminate measures that infringe important 
convention rights87—could be justified along these lines. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
At first sight, the margin of appreciation may seem like a way to limit the 
consequences of the emerging consensus doctrine to suitable circumstances. For 
example, margin of appreciation permits countries to maintain laws that differ 
from the laws of the rest of Europe when they face conditions that are different 
from those of other European countries. This narrow use of margin of 
appreciation allows the ECHR to sustain good policies that suit the interests of 
the country under scrutiny. 
But a closer look at the margin of appreciation doctrine reveals that it can 
do much more than protect policies that suit countries with unique characteristics. 
If the ECHR and the countries under its jurisdiction behave strategically—as they 
often must in order to protect vital interests—the ECHR may err in identifying 
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the true consensus of Europe. The margin of appreciation doctrine can help shape 
the incentives of the ECHR as an institution and the incentives of countries in 
ways that allow the ECHR to discover a genuine European consensus. 
This implies that sometimes the ECHR must grant countries a margin of 
appreciation even though it is convinced that this would maintain sub-optimal 
policies adopted by a particular country. This broader delimitation of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine is essential for a real European consensus to emerge—a 
prerequisite for the ability of emerging consensus to lead to good policy decisions. 
 
